The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China: A Platform ‘On’ China or ‘Against’ China?

An investigative look into IPAC’s activities in Colombia and the unanswered questions surrounding its claims

By Guillermo Rico Reyes

 A Bloc Born in Controversy

Founded on June 4, 2020, the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) presents itself as a cross-party coalition of legislators concerned with China’s global influence. But a closer reading of its actions—particularly in Latin America—suggests the preposition matters. Despite being framed as an alliance on China, its agenda appears overwhelmingly against it.

Colombia’s formal engagement with IPAC began in 2024, when Senator Paola Holguín Moreno joined its ranks. Today, she serves as co-president—a title seemingly shared by every member legislator across IPAC’s operational countries, raising questions about whether the leadership structure is more symbolic than hierarchical.

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 ‘Operation Mist’: Raising Alarms Over Taiwan

Senator Holguín has been actively involved in shaping IPAC’s strategies, particularly what the alliance has branded “Operation Mist.” According to public statements, the initiative seeks to “raise awareness” about the potential consequences of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and its specific implications for Colombia.

Through this lens, IPAC has inserted itself into international debates on Chinese foreign investment, human rights, and regional security. Holguín has been a vocal participant in these forums, though the substance of her critiques often hinges on hypothetical scenarios rather than verifiable evidence.

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 The ‘Invisible’ Legislators

IPAC claims that by 2025, “several Colombian legislators” had joined the initiative. Yet the alliance has never disclosed their names, political affiliations, or identities. This opacity fuels speculation about the actual breadth of its domestic support—and whether those who join do so openly or under conditions of anonymity.

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 Distorting Resolution 2758? A Contentious Claim

A central pillar of IPAC’s platform is its rejection of what it calls China’s “distortion” of UN Resolution 2758. The resolution, adopted in 1971, recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government representing all of China, including Taiwan. IPAC, however, asserts that Beijing misinterprets the text and that Taiwan’s global participation should not be constrained by it. This interpretation remains highly contested and is not reflected in the official UN position.

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 South America: A Growing Foothold

According to IPAC’s own records, Uruguay joined the alliance in October 2024, the same year as Colombia. A subsequent declaration in 2025 claimed that unnamed Latin American legislators had “endorsed the original intent of Resolution 2758,” aligning themselves with IPAC’s stance on Taiwan. Yet again, no specific countries or individuals were named.

What is explicit, however, is IPAC’s stated mission for the region: to scrutinize Chinese investments in strategic sectors—infrastructure, energy, and technology—through parliamentary debates and policy recommendations.

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 Operation Mist: The Economic Argument

Launched formally on March 8, 2024, Operation Mist aims to pressure governments to assess the economic fallout for their countries if a conflict were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait. IPAC cites projections estimating that such a confrontation could cost between $2.5 trillion and $10 trillion USD—consequences described as “five times worse than the war in Ukraine.”

In Colombia, this framework has been used to examine Chinese participation in flagship national projects.

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 The Buriticá Gold Mine: A Case Study in Tension

The Buriticá gold mine, located in the municipality of Buriticá, Antioquia—approximately 1.5 to 2 hours from Medellín along the Pan-American Highway—is operated by Zijin Mining Group through its subsidiary Continental Gold. It is one of the world’s highest-grade gold deposits, with proven reserves exceeding 3.7 million ounces.

Declared a Strategic National Interest Project, the mine received its environmental license in 2016. Commercial production began in December 2020, and it is projected to generate $3 billion in taxes and royalties over its 14-year operational lifespan (through 2034).

Yet the project has faced persistent challenges:

– Security concerns due to armed groups and illegal mining.

– Conflict with informal miners over territory.

– Ongoing debates over the Petro administration’s proposed mining reforms.

Senator Holguín has repeatedly criticized the mine’s operations, citing lawsuits filed by Zijin against the Colombian government over inadequate security guarantees. She has also raised alarms about the government’s environmental and social licensing processes, pointing to the case of Sinochem’s subsidiary Emerald Energy, which failed to obtain a social license for oil exploration in Caquetá due to community opposition over environmental impacts.

Despite these criticisms, the company emphasizes its commitment to modern, sustainable mining, community engagement, and environmental stewardship—positioning itself as a benchmark for best practices in Colombia.

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 The Bogotá Metro: Ambition Under Fire

The Bogotá Metro is another frequent target. The project’s First Line is being built by a consortium led by China Harbor Engineering Company and Xi’an Metro. It is a 23-kilometer elevated line with 16 stations, scheduled to begin operations in 2028.

Holguín has questioned the viability of Chinese companies in Colombia, claiming they are “in crisis” and at risk of sudden failure. She has also criticized President Gustavo Petro’s visits to China and meetings with Chinese officials, accusing him of “not representing Colombia” during his May 2025 trip. Her concerns center on:

– Debt accumulation for infrastructure.

– Loss of sovereignty over strategic sectors.

– Erosion of political decision-making power.

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 A Personal Note: Hidroituango

As someone who has documented the human cost of infrastructure megaprojects, I cannot omit Hidroituango. Its construction—originally led by the Odebrecht and Camargo Correa consortium—resulted in thousands of displacements, dozens of enforced disappearances, and massacres. The environmental catastrophe it triggered remains unresolved.

Chinese companies entered the project long after the dam’s construction was completed. Their role has been in post-disaster stabilization and completion—not the original violations. Yet IPAC’s narrative often conflates timelines and responsibilities, obscuring this distinction.

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 Where Is the Evidence?

Despite the severity of its allegations—against Chinese firms, bilateral agreements, and even the sovereignty of democratically elected governments—neither Senator Holguín nor IPAC has produced concrete, project-specific evidence to support claims of malfeasance, financial unsustainability, or environmental negligence by Chinese companies in Colombia.

Criticisms remain at the level of insinuation, hypothetical conflict scenarios, and generalized distrust. There is no documented trail of contractual breaches, environmental infractions, or labor violations directly attributable to Chinese firms in the projects cited—only speculation and political positioning.

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 Conclusion: A Platform ‘On’ China or ‘Against’ It?

IPAC insists it is an alliance on China. But its founding date—June 4—carries symbolic weight. Its operational language frames Chinese investment as a threat. Its members advocate for containment, not engagement. And its most active voices in Latin America, like Senator Holguín, campaign openly against Chinese participation in strategic sectors without substantiating their claims.

The alliance may present itself as a forum for dialogue and awareness. But its actions, opacity, and ideological tenor suggest a different mandate entirely—one aimed not at understanding China, but at pushing it away.

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This article is based on publicly available information and institutional declarations from IPAC, statements by Senator Paola Holguín Moreno, and project data from Colombian regulatory and corporate sources.